COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA Present: Judges Bray, Annunziata and Overton DANA CHENAULT MEMORANDUM OPINION v. Record No. 0992-96-3 PER CURIAM SEPTEMBER 2, 1997 EDWARD E. MANGUS FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CAMPBELL COUNTY J. Samuel Johnston, Jr., Judge (B. Leigh Drewry, Jr., on brief), for appellant. No brief for appellee. Dana Chenault (mother) appeals the decision of the circuit court finding no arrearage in child support payments from Edward Mangus (father). The trial court ruled that the Virginia circuit court which ordered father to pay child support in 1988 did not have in personam jurisdiction. On appeal, mother contends that (1) oral agreements settling issues of property and support are enforceable in final decrees; and (2) an out-of-state defendant may accept service of process and confer in personam jurisdiction on a Virginia court. Upon reviewing the record and opening brief, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. Rule 5A:27. The parties were married in Virginia in 1973, and two of their three children were born in Virginia. In 1983, the family moved to South Carolina, where they lived at the time of the parties' separation in 1986. Mother subsequently moved to Virginia with the children. Father agreed to pay $75 per week in child support. In 1987, mother filed a bill of complaint, seeking a divorce and child support in the amount of $75 per week. Father was served in South Carolina by a subpoena in chancery, and endorsed the return of service. The divorce decree was entered January 12, 1988, and included a provision requiring father to pay $75 weekly in child support. Mother subsequently sought to recover over $25,000 in child support arrearages. The trial court found that there was no enforceable arrearage because the circuit court in 1988 lacked in personam jurisdiction over father and, therefore, was without authority to order father to pay support. While mother raises two issues, the question whether the parties' oral agreement was enforceable is moot if the trial court properly determined that the original court exceeded its jurisdiction when it ordered father to pay support. While a court with in rem jurisdiction may enter a divorce decree, "[p]ersonal rights, which include property and support rights in divorce cases, may not be adjudicated by a court lacking in personam jurisdiction." Gibson v. Gibson, 5 Va. App. 426, 429, 364 S.E.2d 518, 519 (1988). See Toomey v. Toomey, 19 Va. App. 756, 758-59, 454 S.E.2d 735, 736-37 (1995). Cf. Commonwealth ex rel. Kenitzer v. Richter, 23 Va. App. 186, 192-93, 475 S.E.2d 817, 820 (1996). Husband had notice of the Virginia action and was served with process. Neither factor, however, gave the Virginia court in personam jurisdiction over father. See Toomey, 19 Va. App. at 759, 454 S.E.2d at 736-37. Similarly, father was not subject to in personam jurisdiction in Virginia under any of the provisions of Virginia's "long arm statute" as it existed at the time mother commenced this action. No agreement had been executed in Virginia, no support had been ordered, and Virginia was not the matrimonial domicile at the time of separation. Therefore, father was not subject to Virginia's in personam jurisdiction, and the trial court in 1988 could not order him to pay child support. Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily affirmed. Affirmed.